Initiated antitrust investigation 2i gas retainer by the Italgas. As reported in the Bulletin of the Competition and Markets Authority (AGCM), it was deemed necessary “to proceed with further investigative investigations to assess whether the operation in question significantly impedes effective competition.” may arise”.
Privileges under the lens of Agcm
In a device published by the Competition and Markets Guarantor Authority (Agcm), Headed by Roberto Rustichelli, it is clarified that the operation, aimed at exclusive control of 2i Rete Gas, “constitutes a concentration that mainly affects the gas distribution sector”. A document available on the AGCM website indicates that “the only relevant form of competition in this context is that Participation in local competitions For Assignment of Expired Privileges”.
Antitrust has focused its attention on 32 regional areas (Atem), which represent the areas in which gas distribution activity is distributed and where concessions are assigned to operators. In each of these areas, two operators involved in operation control At least 20 percent of the market. The concessions affected by this condition concern the following areas: Agrigento, Bari 2, Benevento, Brescia 5, Caltanissetta, Campobasso, Caserta 2, Catania 1, Frosinone 2, L’Aquila 2, Mantua 2, Massa Carrara, Matera, Messina 2, Milan 2, Naples 2, Novara 2, Padua 2, Padua 3, Potenza 1, Potenza 2, Ragusa, Reggio Calabria-Vibo Valentia, Rome 4, Rome 5, Salerno 1, Salerno 3, Teramo, Turin 6, Trapani, Varese 1 and Viterbo.
Another group
In another group of concessions, which include Barletta-Andria-Trani, Caserta 1, Cosenza 2 and Pisa, 2i manages the Pdr (meter) share in Rete Gas Atem. Between 15% and 20%. Although this “dominance” position is lower than the previous group, antitrust emphasizes that it is negligible. In fact, in these atoms, there are no third-party operators or their presence is minimal. As a result, even these concessions may result in a direct competitive constraint, in which the operation may be exposed to the risk of further strengthening the incumbent operator, discouraging other operators from participating in the tenders.
The third group
Finally, there is a final package of 29 concessions related to the Atems of Alessandria 4, Ascoli Piceno, Asti, Cosenza 1, Cuneo 1, Foggia 2, Genoa 2, Imperia, Isernia, Latina, Lecce 2, Lecco 2, Lodi 2 . Lucca, Messina 1, Milan 3, Milan 4, Monza Brianza 1, Naples 4, Palermo 2, Perugia 1, Pescara, Rieti, Rovigo, Savona 1, Savona 2, Syracuse, Terni, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola.
In these cases, the anti-competitive effects of the operation appear to be primarily linked to the fact that a A significant increase in the dominant manager’s overall share, which may discourage other operators from participating, making Atem less competitive during tenders.
What will Italgas have to do?
In the remaining 36 atoms, where there are overlaps between the two operators, the competition has no significant effect, since the presence of one of the two operators is limited.
It is therefore the areas in which the presence of two operators is most important that any corrective measures that Atalgas will have to propose in order to gain approval from the Authority will have to be focused on. Only in this way will it be possible to create a central European operator in gas distribution, able to guarantee investment 15.6 billion euros.
